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106 ESTATE OF WIELING [37 C.2d 
[8. F. No. 17933. Tn Bank. May 4, 1951.J 
Estate of ANDREW WIELING, Deceased. DA VID LUCH-
SINGER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v. ANDREW 
WIELING, JR., as Executor, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Be-Property Bettle-
ment Agreements.-In an heirship proceeding in which the 
status of property held in unequal amounts in the separate 
names of deceased spouses was in issue, the court could reason-
ably conclude that, when the wife acquired the last parcel 
taken in her name, she had achieved an equal division, where 
there was testimony that the oral agreement that each of the 
spouses should have half of the property was carried out, and 
no evidence that the relative values of the properties remained 
the same from the date of the last acquisition until the death 
of the spouses. 
[2] Id.-Transactions Inter Be-Changing Character of Property. 
-In construing an agreement changing the status from com-
munity property to the separate property of the spouses. 
which agreement was subject to conflicting inferences as to 
the intention of the parties, the court could reasonably con-
clude that from the time the agreement was made the parties 
intended that the property in the name of each spouse was 
his or her separat(' property, where, thereafter, although the 
wife collected rents on all the property, she paid taxes and 
made repairs on her property only and made it clear to the 
husband that he was solely responsible for the taxes on and 
maintenance of his property. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Actions-Testimony of Parties. 
-An heirship proceeding involving the community or separate 
status of property of deceased spouses is not an action on a 
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, 
and the sole heir and devisee of the husband is not incompetent 
to testify as to events occurring and contracts made prior t. 
the deaths of the spouses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1880.) 
[4] Witnesses-Credibility-Province of Court and Jury.-It is 
for the trial court to determine what credit shall be given to 
the testimony of an interested witness. 
[2] See 13 Cal.Jur. 845; 26 Am.Jur. 858. 
[3) See llA Cal.Jur. 888,889. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 157(8); [21 
Husband and Wife, § 159; [3) Decedents' Estates, § 582; [4] Wit-
nesses, § 281; [5] Husband and Wife, § 91 j [6] Husband and 
Wife, §l74. 
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[6] Husband and Wife-Property-Determination of Character-
Evidence.-In an heirship proceeding involving the .~om­
munity or separate status of property of deceasl'd spOllses, a 
finding that property held in the name of the deceased hus-
band was his separate property is supported by testimony of 
his sole heir and devisee that the spouses entered into an 
agreement that each should have half of their property in 
his or her own name and have it as his or her own property, 
and that such agreement was carried out. 
[6] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud and Undue Influence-Evi-
dence.-In an heirship proceeding involving the community 
or separate status of property of deceased spouses, the court 
was justified in concluding that any presumption of unifue 
influence or fraud in the execution of an agreement making 
the property separate was rebuttl'd by evidence that the wife 
was aware of the community status of thl' property when she 
conceived and proposed the agreement, and that the husband 
was (,Olltent to keep the property that stood in his nap.1C within 
the community. (Civ. Code, §§ 158,2235.) 
APPEAL from a judgm('nt of the Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County determining that certain realty stand-
ing in name of deceased husband was llis separate property. 
Hugh Dono-yan, Judge. Affirmed. 
Lorne M. Stanley and Douglas A. Pease for Appellant. 
Carlson, Collins & Gordon, Frederick Bold, Jr., and Harold 
F. Sawallisch for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The administrator of the estate of Matilda 
Wieling appeals from a jUdgment of the probate court in an 
heirship proceeding determining tbat certain real property 
was the separate property of .Andrew 'Wieling and not his 
and his wife's eommunity property. 
Andrew and Matilda Wieling were married in 1912. Ma-
tilda had five children by a previous marriage, four of wbom 
survived ber. Andrew Wieling, Jr., is tbe only cbild of the 
marriage between Andrew and Matilda and is the sole bene-
ficiary of Andrew's will. Andrew died January 13, 1947, 
and Matilda May 9, 1947. During their marriage tbey ac-
quired eleven parcels of real property. Title to seven of 
these pareels was taken in Andrew's name, and title to the 
remaining four in :Matilda's name. Tbe evidence is not 
clear whether the money used to purchase the property was the 
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community property or the separate property of either spouse. 
One of the lots in Matilda's name was a gift from two of her 
children. 
On the basis of the foregoing evidence and applicable pre-
sumptions appellant contends that the property in Matilda's 
name was her separate property (Civ. Code, § 164), and that 
the property in Andrew's name was community property, 
on the ground that it was acquired by him after marriage 
other than by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. (Civ. Code, 
§§ 168, 164.) Respondent Andrew Wieling, Jr., executor 
of the estate of Andrew, contends that the property in 
Andrew's name became his separate property by virtue of 
an ora] agreement between him and Matilda. It is therefore 
necessary to determine whether the evidence relating to the 
alleged oral agreement sustains the trial court's finding that 
the seven parcels in Andrew's name were his separate property. 
Evidence of the agreement was presented by respondent, 
who testified that in 1925, when Matilda took title'in her name 
to the tenth parcel of property, Andrew asked her, "Why 
wasn't it good enough to keep all of it in the community'" 
She said, "I am going to have half of it in my name and half 
in your name, and we each have our own property, and there 
won't be any trouble about it." Respondent further testi-
fied: "My mother [Matilda] was going to have half in her 
name, and my father [Andrew] was going to have half in 
his name, and she was going to build up nntil she got that 
much .... That plan was followed out right to a 'T'." At 
the time the agreement was made there were seven parcels 
in Andrew's name and two in Matilda's name. At that time 
Matilda took title to a third parcel, and the following year 
she took title to a fourth parcel No additional property 
was acquired by either spouse, and at the time of their deaths 
in 1947 the appraised value of the property in Andrew's 
name was approximately twice that of the property in Ma-
tilda's name. 
Appellant does not dispute the rule that by oral agreement 
husband and wife can change the character of their property 
(see Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 789 [167 P.2d 708]; 
Tomaier v. Tomaier, 28 Ca1.2d 754, 757-758 [146 P.2d 9051). 
He contends that the agreement was not carried into effect, 
since Matilda acquired only four parcels against Andrew's 
seven, and since the property in Andrew's name was worth 
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dcnce. however. that the relative valueR of the properties re-
mained the same in the 2] -year period between 1926. when 
the last parcel was acquired, and the deaths of the spouses; 
and since respondent testified that the agreement was carried 
ont, the trial court could reasonably conclude that when 
Matilda acquired the last parcel in 1926 she had achieved an 
equal division. 
Even if it be assumed, however, that Matilda did not 
succeed in acquiring property equivalent in value to that 
held by Andrew, it does not follow that the agreement 
was ineffective to make the property in his name his separate 
property. [2] It could be inferred from the terms of the 
original agreement either that Matilda was not to lose her 
interest in the community property until she acquired sep-
arate property equivalent in value to that held by Andrew, 
or that the parties intended that the property held in the 
name of each should immediately become separate property 
and that any inequality should be rectified as additional 
property was acquired. After the agreement Matilda re-
garded the property in Andrew's name as his property. 
Although she collected rents on both his property and hers, 
she paid taxes and made repairs on her property only and 
made it 'clear to Andrew that he was solely responsible for 
the taxes on and maintenance of his property. From this 
evidence the trial court could reasonably conclude that from 
the time the agreement was made the parties intended that 
the property in the name of each spouse was his or her 
separate property~ 
[3] Appellant contends, however, that the evidence does 
not support the finding of the trial court because it consists 
almost wholly of the testimony of respondent, an interested 
witness, given after the parties to the contract were dead. 
The present action, however, is not on a claim or demand 
against the estate of a deceased person within the meaning of 
s<'ction 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Streeter v. 
Martinelli, 65 Cal.App.2d 65, 71-72 [149 P.2d 725) ; Bollinger 
v. Wright, 143 Cal. 292, 296 [76 P. 1108), and accordingly 
respondent was not incompetent to testify to events occurring 
before the deaths of the parties. [4] It was for the trial 
court to determine what credit should be given his testimony 
(Estate of Duncan, 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d 174]). 
[5] The trial court accepted it as true, and it supports th~ 
finding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1844.) 
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[6] Finally, appellant contends that under the agree-
ment Andrew gained an advantage over his wife, and that 
it must therefore be presumed that the agreement was the 
result of undue influence or fraud. (See Civ. Code §§ 158, 
2235; MC/lay v. McKay, 184 Cal. 742, 746 [195 P. 385].) 
There is evidence, however, that Matilda was aware of the 
status of the property at the time she proposed the agreement. 
Andrew was willing to keep the property that stood in his 
name within the community. Since the agreement was con-
ceived by her and not the result of any suggestion or act 
on the part of her husband, the trial court was justified in 
concluding that any presumption of undue influence or 
fraud had been rebutted. (Smith v. Lombard, 201 Cal. 518, 
524-525 [258 P. 55].) 
The judgment is affirmcd. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. / 
